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Abstract
The EU is currently drawing up its agenda EU2020 for the next
decade. In doing so, account must be taken of the successes and limi-
tations of the Lisbon Agenda 2000-2009, notably the failure to achieve
a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion.
From the experience of the Lisbon Agenda, we learn that social pol-
icy and economic policy have to be designed together, in such a way
that their actions are complementary rather than in conﬂict. If real
progress is to be made in reducing poverty in Europe in the next
decade, then it is essential that in the EU2020 Agenda social inclusion
should receive the same prominence as the other EU objectives. It is
therefore welcome that the Commission has proposed the setting of a
poverty target, but this raises many issues. The paper focuses on two:
the choice of target variable (risk of poverty or material deprivation)
and the extent of ambition. Moreover, alongside the introduction of a
social inclusion target(s) there has to be an agreed procedure for mon-
itoring progress. Finally, in order to make real progress, the EU needs
to take concrete policy initiatives. The proposal made here is that
the EU begins with a Guaranteed Income for Children. Each Member
State would be required to guarantee unconditionally to every child a
basic income. This measure would signiﬁcantly reduce child poverty,
and would contribute positively to the achievement of other EU2020
objectives in the ﬁelds of education and employment.
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) is developing its objectives for the new decade.
The European Commission has put forward an ambitious programme under
the heading of “EU 2020”, and proposed a set of ﬁve headline targets, which
constitute shared objectives guiding the action of the Member States and of
the Union. One of these targets is the reduction of poverty. In this paper, I
examine the issues involved in the setting of such a target and in monitoring
performance over time.
Before looking forward, it is wise to look back. In the ﬁrst half of the
paper, I investigate the successes and failures of the Lisbon Agenda, which
was the ﬂagship policy established in 2000 for the ﬁrst decade of this century.
A full evaluation is not yet possible. It is not easy to assess how far the
Lisbon Strategy has been blown oﬀ course by the economic crisis. Much
of the necessary data are not available as I write (in April 2010). But it
is possible to draw some lessons from the experience up to 2008, and these
lessons should inform the plans for the next decade.
The EU 2020 programme is due to be agreed at the June 2010 European
Council meeting. In considering the possible poverty targets, and the way
in which they are monitored, this paper can only work on the basis of the
Communiqué from the March 2010 European Council. The second half of the
paper discusses the present state of EU 2020 as “work in progress”. As such
it may be overtaken by events, but it may also contribute to those events. A
number of the issues discussed in the paper, such as the choice between an at-
risk-of-poverty measure and a measure of material deprivation, are central to
the speciﬁcation of the target. In implementing the target, a crucial question
is the way in which progress will be monitored. If the EU adopts a poverty
reduction target, how can it be achieved? What positive proposals can be
made?
The principal conclusions are summarised at the end of the paper.
2 Looking back: the successes and failures of the Lisbon Agenda
In the year 2000, the EU Heads of State and Government agreed on the Lis-
bon Agenda of making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy... with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.
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2.1 The Lisbon objectives and the implicit assumptions
For those concerned with the social dimension of Europe, the Lisbon Agenda
represented a very welcome departure, in that “social cohesion” appeared
alongside growth and employment. As later developed, there were four pil-
lars: growth, employment, social inclusion and sustainability. At the same
time, there were aspects of this Agenda that should at the outset have been
given closer attention (here I am entering a mea culpa). Implicit in the formu-
lation of the Agenda, and explicit in the subsequent mid-term re-formulation,
was the assumption that the four goals are complementary. Achievement of
one goal was assumed not to conﬂict with the other goals. Economic growth
could be achieved without threatening sustainability. Higher employment
would improve the degree of social inclusion. This assumption was crucial to
the way in which the Agenda was implemented. If the goals are complemen-
tary, policy could be pursued in one domain without regard to the spillover
to other domains, since these by assumption would be positive.
We have however to ask whether this assumption is warranted. It is
of course possible that, for example, labour market reform and social policy
work in the same direction. The European Commission has stressed for many
years the role of social protection as a productive factor: that social policy
can work with, not against, the grain of economic policy. But this is not
necessarily the case. Complementarity can only be assured with the proper
design of policy. A positive impact of higher employment on social inclusion
depends on the means by which it is achieved. There is no necessary reason
why economic growth should “trickle down” to the least advantaged; the
beneﬁt to the excluded depends on the form of growth and the distribution
of its fruits.
Where the choice of policies potentially aﬀects all objectives, this means
that policy-making has to be made in a uniﬁed way. The Economic Policy
Committee leads on economic growth, but it has to take account of the
diﬀerential impact of diﬀerent policies on the social inclusion objective. The
Employment Committee leads on labour market reform but has to recognise
that these reforms have distributional implications that impinge on the social
inclusion objective. Equally both Committees must take account of their
impact on the environmental performance. Conversely, policies designed by
the Social Protection Committee and under the Sustainable Development
Strategy have to be chosen with regard to their economic and employment
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consequences. In short, a “joined-up” approach to policymaking is required.
The second concern about the Lisbon formulation regards the ambition
of making the EU the “most dynamic economy”. The subtext appeared to
be that the goal is that of competing with the United States (and this is
implied by the fact that the structural indicators published by Eurostat in-
clude the United States and Japan but no other country). As such, given
the history of the 1990s, the goal seems an understandable one. However, on
a wider perspective, the objective seems insuﬃciently reﬂective of the global
position of Europe. Given that EU Member States beneﬁted from the “great
divergence” of the past two centuries, it must be the expectation that Europe
will grow more slowly than the developing world. Convergence is surely an
ambition that is not limited by the boundaries of the EU. The EU has indeed
demonstrated its concern with development funding, for example, in pledging
increased Oﬃcial Development Assistance. It would be good if this could be
taken a step further in an explicit recognition of the global responsibilities of
the EU. Poverty is a global problem. Social exclusion has a major interna-
tional dimension, which I do not discuss further but which should underlie
EU policy as a whole.
2.2 The Lisbon scorecard and statistical indicators
The bald facts of the Lisbon scorecard are readily available from the Eurostat
website, and are summarized for the period up to 2008 in Figure 1.
The graph shows the “headline” score for three of the four objectives:
growth, employment, and social inclusion. In the case of the growth objec-
tive, there was a modest rise in EU27 GDP per capita relative to that in
the US between 1999 and 2002, but then a decline, so that the subsequent
improvement over the rest of the period left the position little diﬀerent from
that in 2002. It is in the case of employment that most progress has been
made, even if the 70 per cent target has not met: there has been a rise in
the employment rate for workers aged 15 to 64 from 62 per cent in 1999 to
66 per cent in 2008. The increase in the employment rate has been particu-
larly marked for older workers (those aged 55-64) whose employment rate has
risen from 36.5 to 45.6 per cent. This rise of a quarter must be heralded as a
success for the Lisbon Strategy, even if it may reﬂect changed attitudes and
capacities of the age cohort. In contrast, the social inclusion indicator shows
no improvement over the period. The proportion of EU25 citizens living in
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Figure 1: Key structural indicators EU27 1999-2008
households at-risk-of-poverty was estimated to be 16 per cent in 1999 and to
be 16 per cent in 2008 (17 per cent in EU27).1
Before examining the reasons for the failure to reduce the risk of poverty,
we should note the degree to which the EU policy process is dependant on
the availability of high-quality statistics. There can be little doubt that
here we have seen a remarkable improvement in recent decades. Nowhere
is this clearer than in the case of the poverty estimates. Twenty years ago,
Michael O’Higgins and Stephen Jenkins (1990) were asked by the Commission
to make estimates of poverty in the EC countries.2 They pieced together
national statistics on poverty in an impressive way, but the sources were
fragmentary, as may be seen from the summary in Table 1. There was no
common European data source. It is only on account of the creation ﬁrst of
the European Community Household Panel, and then of the EU Survey of
1For all Member States except Ireland the UK, the poverty estimates relate to the
income year preceding the survey year. The data are shown by survey year.
2Earlier estimates had been made for 1973/77 as part of the First European Poverty
Programme.
6A.B. Atkinson / WP n.24 DiSSE, University of Macerata
Table 1: Sources of data used by O’Higgins and Jenkins (1990)
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), that it has been possible to make
estimates using a data source that is comparable across Member States.
It is also important to remember that what we are looking at are indica-
tors. Not only is the quantity measured with error (for example, sampling
error in household surveys) but also the variable measured is only an indicator
of the underlying concept. This applies as much to GDP as to the measure
of risk of poverty. GDP is an indicator of the extent of economic activity.
It is deﬁned according to a set of conventions (the UN System of National
Accounts (SNA)) and is measured using a variety of statistical procedures.
These procedures, for example, are designed to allow GDP per capita to be
compared across Member States. In such a comparison, account has to be
taken of the fact that, even where there is a common currency, prices may dif-
fer. It is for this reason that GDP is compared in terms of purchasing power.
Where the currency diﬀers, then we cannot simply convert at the exchange
rate; a purchasing power parity is used (referred to as GDP at PPP). These
PPP calculations are intended to allow comparisons at a point in time. Can
they be applied to changes over time, as when measuring growth rates? The
Eurostat “Quality proﬁle” appears ambivalent. On the one hand, it states in
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paragraph 2 that the “indicator plays a role in evaluating actual economic
convergence”; on the other hand, it warns in paragraph 6 that the indicator
“is not suited for comparisons over time” (Eurostat, 2010). Underlying this
ambivalence is an inherent index number problem: how can an aggregate
economic outlay be adjusted when there are changing (and diﬀerent) relative
prices?
The conventions used to construct the indicators are not just of footnote
importance. A good example is provided by the measurement of the output of
the government sector, which is now a signiﬁcant fraction of GDP. Following
the recommendations of the UN 1993 SNA, Eurostat in the European System
of Accounts (ESA 1995) introduced direct measures of the output of the
government sector. The contribution to GDP growth of the health sector, of
education, of social services, etc. is measured by indicators of outputs, not,
as in the past, by measures of the inputs. This advance has not however been
followed by the United States, which continues to assume that outputs grow
at the same rate as inputs. This means that they are measuring growth on a
diﬀerent basis. In the case of the UK, we found (Atkinson 2005) that this led
to a higher measured growth in the US, accounting for 1
4 per cent diﬀerence
in the annual growth rates. If the two economies had been compared on
the same basis, then the gap would have been smaller. Even therefore such
widely-used statistics as those for GDP need to be interpreted with care.
With the indicators for poverty and social exclusion, the underlying frame-
work has been much debated, and the concept has much in common with the
description of “Ballungen (congestions)” developed by Otto Neurath. As de-
scribed by Cartwright and Bradburn, with such concepts “there is a lot packed
into it; there is often no central core ...diﬀerent features from the conges-
tion (Ballung) can matter for diﬀerent uses; whether a feature counts as in or
outside the concept, and how far, is context and use dependent” (2010, page
4). Put starkly, the EU social inclusion indicators have sought to combine
diﬀerent strands – an Anglo-Saxon concern with ﬁnancial poverty, a Conti-
nental concern with exclusion, widespread pressure for multi-dimensionality.
The resulting indicators are multi-layered and, if ﬁnancial poverty remains
the headline indicator, it has acquired the new title of “at-risk-of-poverty”.
There remain therefore major conceptual issues, and I return to one as-
pect in Section 2: the choice between the at-risk-of-poverty measure and a
measure of material deprivation. On top of these basic issues, we have – as in-
dicated in Figure 1 – the additional problem of the break in statistical sources
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Figure 2: National poverty estimates
as a result of the move from the European Community Household panel to
the EU-SILC. As a result, the Structural Indicator has a discontinuity after
2001. For example, the ﬁgure for Italy for 2004 of 19% is not comparable
with that for 2001 or earlier. Eurostat has sought to bridge this gap and its
best estimate for EU25 is that there was no change in the at-risk-of-poverty
rate from 1999 to 2004.
The uncertainty surrounding the EU25 indicator over this period sug-
gests that we need to cross-check with national sources. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of the poverty rate in four large EU countries: France, Germany,
Italy and the UK. These national sources too have their limitations. The
series for France has a break when the source changed. Up to 2005 the
poverty estimates were based on the Enquête Revenus Fiscaux; from 2006
the source became the Enquête Revenus Fiscaux et Sociaux. The new source
contains data on social beneﬁts that had previously been imputed and more
complete information on capital incomes. The estimate on the new basis
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extrapolated backwards for 2005 shows a rise in the estimated poverty rate
from 12.0 to 13.1 per cent. The German series is based on the long-running
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), but this has evolved over the years.
Recently, for example, there has been a major revision of the treatment of
non-response. Non-response can take the form of the whole household failing
to respond, in which case the results are typically re-weighted to allow for the
diﬀerential rates of non-response by known household characteristics. The
household may respond but fail to provide all the necessary information,
in which case imputation methods are often applied, for example substi-
tuting the investment income information from a matched household that
responded in full. Partial non-response may however also take the form of
complete non-response by some, but not all, household members. The work
of Frick, Grabka and Groh-Samberg (2010) has shown the sensitivity of the
estimates to the choice between diﬀerent methods of adjustment for the last
of these types of non-response. In the case of the SOEP, the revisions in
2009 led to the estimated poverty rate from the 2005 survey being reduced
by nearly 4 percentage points (Frick and Krell, 2010, footnote 27 and Table
2). The extent of the adjustment serves as a reminder that the statistics are
surrounded by a degree of uncertainty.
Bearing this qualiﬁcation in mind, we may see from Figure 2 that there
appear to have been modest reductions since 2000 in the poverty rates in
France and the UK, oﬀset by a rise in Germany. The four countries shown
account for a large part of the total EU population, and hence for the overall
stability, but a similar pattern is found in other Member States: the gains
in some countries (Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia all had reductions
in excess of 2 percentage points between survey years 2004 and 2007) are
counter-balanced by movements in the opposite direction in other countries.
2.3 Why did the EU poverty rate not fall?
There are several possible reasons why there has been no substantial progress.
The ﬁrst is that the social inclusion objective has received less priority. This
does indeed appear to have been the case. The absence of concrete EU targets
means that, from the outset, social objectives appeared less urgent. More-
over, the status of the declared social objective was been put into question
in the mid-term review of the Lisbon Agenda. In November 2004 a High-
Level Group chaired by Wim Kok reported on the lack of progress towards
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the Lisbon objectives and recommended that overriding priority be given to
economic and employment growth policies. The Kok Report argued that ful-
ﬁlment of the social objectives would result from progress in these two areas:
primacy should therefore be given to job creation. The change in direction
advocated by the Kok Group was reﬂected in the 2005 Mid-term Review of
the Lisbon Agenda. The March 2005 European Council concluded that “it is
essential to relaunch the Lisbon Strategy without delay and re-focus priori-
ties on growth and employment.” Even if the European Council conclusions
a year later sought to ensure that “parallel progress is made on employment
creation, competitiveness, and social cohesion in compliance with European
values” (March 2006 European Council), there seemed to be a down-grading
of the social agenda.
The second reason lies in the inter-relation between policies that I have
already evoked. The Kok Report assumed that increased employment and
growth would lead to achievement of the social objectives. This assumption
needs to be re-examined. It is reasonable neither to simply assume that the
objectives are complementary nor to draw conclusions simply from the fact
that poverty has not been reduced. It is after all possible that employment
policy worked in the direction of reducing poverty and that, in the absence
of the policy, poverty would have increased. One of the forces underlying the
adoption of the Lisbon Agenda was a concern that Europe needs to adapt to
a changing environment with increased global competition and technological
change.
To this end, let us consider the operation of the labour market. Here it
is essential to take account of the heterogeneity of the labour force. While
it may be possible to discuss macro-economic aggregates on the basis of
the assumption that all workers are identical, such a simplifying assumption
would rule out the very issues of inclusion with which we are concerned.
A key distinction - recognised in the EU education objectives and in the
reference to a “knowledge-based economy” - is that according to level of skill.
In Figure 3 the labour force is shown in terms of productivity, from O to
T (for total), where the less skilled are to the left and the most skilled to
the right. Since productivity is typically an increasing and then decreasing
function of age, we will also ﬁnd younger and older workers to the left and
prime age workers to the right. Each worker is assumed to have a reservation
wage; for simplicity, these reservation wages are assumed equal for all.
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Figure 3: Worker productivities and the employment rate
The demand side of the labour market is often down-played, but the level
of employment depends on the willingness of employers to create jobs. For
the employer there are costs. These costs are in part transactional (recruit-
ment and training) and in part recurrent (cost of the workplace, employer
taxes, etc.). When the costs of job creation are subtracted from the worker
productivity, this determines whether there is a potential “surplus” over the
worker reservation wage. In Figure 3, such a surplus exists and jobs are cre-
ated to the right of the point A, so that the employment rate is AT. There
are, as shown, some workers whose productivity, net of the job costs, is not
suﬃcient to generate a surplus, and the employment rate is less than 100
per cent, the workers to the left of A either being unemployed or leaving
the labour force (for example through early retirement). It should be noted
that such non-employment depends on both sides of the labour market: the
willingness of employers to create jobs as well as the reservation wage of the
workers. Finally, for those in employment, the level of wages is assumed to
be determined by bargaining, either individually or collectively. In Figure
3 there is assumed to be a sharing of the surplus as indicated by the heavy
dashed line.
The aim of EU employment policy has been to shift the point A to the left.
Raising employment, or at least reducing unemployment, is clearly desirable,
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Figure 4: Policies to reduce reservation wage
but it does not necessarily contribute to the social inclusion objective. In
Figure 4 is shown the eﬀect of policies that seek to raise employment by
reducing reservation wages. Much of the thrust of labour market reform has
been in this direction, by reducing the level and coverage of social protection
and tightening the conditions under which beneﬁts are paid.
As shown in Figure 4, reductions in the reservation wage may indeed
raise the employment rate: the point A is shifted to the left. But this may
be obtained at the cost of an increase in the number of low paid workers, as
has been reported for instance in Germany, where the proportion of workers
earning less than two-thirds of the median gross hourly earnings rose from
15.7 per cent in 1998 to 20.7 per cent in 2006 (Becker and Hauser, 2009,
Table 30). In the analysis of Figure 4, not only are the newly employed
paid less than their previous reservation wage, but also wages are reduced
for those previously in employment. If the poverty line is as shown in Figure
4, then all those in the range A to B are members of the “working poor”.
Such a negative impact on the poverty rate could however be avoided by
alternative policies, such as those to reduce the costs of job creation. As is
shown in Figure 5, such reductions would increase the employment rate but
increase wages. Complementarity can therefore be achieved, but it cannot
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Figure 5: Policies to reduce cost of job creation
be assumed.
The third reason for the failure to achieve a decisive reduction in poverty
appears to have been the over-reliance of the Open Method of Co-ordination
on national policy initiatives. As we have seen, some countries achieved
reductions in their poverty rates, reﬂecting the priority given by their national
governments. Other Member States saw increasing poverty rates. In my
judgment, a signiﬁcant reduction in European poverty requires concerted
European action.
3 Europe 2020 and policies for the new decade
In the Lisbon Strategy there were no concrete EU targets. There was a
general aspiration to make “a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty
and social exclusion by 2010”, but nothing corresponding to the explicit target
in the case of the employment rate. Target-setting for social inclusion was
left to Member States: “the European Council stresses the importance of
the ﬁght against poverty and social exclusion. Member States are invited
to set targets, in their National Action Plans, for signiﬁcantly reducing the
number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2010” (Presidency
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conclusions of the March 2002 Barcelona European Council). To the – limited
– extent to which Member States have taken up this invitation (see Marlier
et al, 2007), the resulting targets were speciﬁc to each country. They were
not necessarily coherent, in that diﬀerent poverty thresholds were used, and
diﬀerent dimensions of social exclusion were highlighted in diﬀerent Member
States.
If real progress is to be made in reducing poverty in Europe in the next
decade, then it is essential that social inclusion should receive the same
prominence as the other EU objectives. It is therefore welcome that the
Commission has proposed the setting of a poverty target (European Com-
mission, 2010). In its communiqué, Europe 2020: A new European strategy
for jobs and growth, the March 2010 European Council “agreed on the follow-
ing headline targets, which constitute shared objectives guiding the action of
the Member States and of the Union:
 raising to 75% the employment rate for men and women aged 20-64 {in
2008 was 70.5%};
 improving the conditions for research and development [target = spend-
ing of 3% GDP] {currently 1.9%};
 reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels,
increasing the share of renewables in ﬁnal energy consumption to 20%,
and moving towards 20% increase in energy eﬃciency;
 improving education levels;
 promoting social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty.
The precise formulation of the poverty objective remains to be decided
at the June European Council. In this section, I consider a number of issues
raised by such a target-setting exercise, the need for target-monitoring, and
make one concrete policy proposal.
3.1 Setting a poverty target: choice of indicator
The setting of targets raises many issues. Here I focus on two: the choice
of target variable and the extent of ambition. The ﬁrst issue has been much
rehearsed in the design of the common social indicators, particularly by the
Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee, whose work over
the past decade has laid the groundwork for EU2020. The second issue has
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been much less discussed. Marlier et al, refer to the need for “ambitious and
achievable targets” (2007, page 213), but this needs to be made concrete.
The choice of target variable for social inclusion takes us back to the
need to “unpack” this congested concept. As already stressed, agreement on
the EU common social indicators was in part achieved by weaving together
threads from diﬀerent traditions and preoccupations. The multi-dimensional
nature of the social inclusion scoreboard reﬂected the underlying diversity.
It follows that choice of a single, or possibly two, headline indicators is go-
ing to privilege particular perspectives. This is well illustrated by the choice
between the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the rate of material deprivation. Ma-
terial deprivation, as deﬁned in the common social indicators, measures the
proportion of the population living in households that have an enforced lack
of at least 3 out of the following 9 items: ability to face unexpected expenses,
ability to pay for one week annual holiday away from home, existence of rent,
utility, loan or other arrears, capacity to have a meal with meat, chicken, ﬁsh
or vegetarian equivalent every second day, capacity to keep home adequately
warm, possession of a washing machine, possession of a colour TV, posses-
sion of a telephone, and possession of a personal car. As is illustrated in
Figure 6, the Member States score rather diﬀerently on these two variables.
The correlation is low. If we consider those countries below and above the
EU27 (population-weighted) average, then we ﬁnd that it is primarily the
new Member States which lie above in the dimension of material depriva-
tion, whereas for the at-risk-of-poverty indicator there are both old and new
Member States (including Italy and the UK) with above-average scores.
The essential diﬀerences between the two indicators are twofold. First,
the at-risk-of-poverty indicator is a national one (deﬁned as having income
below 60 per cent of the country median). Moving to the material depriva-
tion indicator described above would mean adopting a common list of items,
applicable as much in Bulgaria as in Luxembourg. This shift in the refer-
ence population would be a major shift. Secondly, the material deprivation
indicator is independent of changes in overall standards of living, unlike the
at-risk-of-poverty indicator which depends on current income. These two
elements can of course be separated. Calculations have already been made
of the at-risk-of-poverty measure deﬁned in relation to the EU-wide median
(see Atkinson, 1998); the EU common indicators include at-risk-of-poverty
calculations based on national median cut-oﬀs anchored in real terms. But
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Figure 6: Plot of Material deprivation 2008 against At-risk-of-
poverty 2008
it is clear that both would have signiﬁcant implications.
One response to the diﬀerences identiﬁed above is to incorporate indica-
tors of both at-risk-of-poverty and material deprivation. This however con-
verts the issue of deﬁnition into an issue of aggregation. Here many questions
arise. If both dimensions enter the headline target, then how are they to be
combined? Should we attach more weight to the dimension on which a coun-
try is performing less well? Member States may wish to determine their own
priorities, but if weights diﬀer across countries then there is little meaning to
an EU-wide objective. Performance according to UK weights may be quite
diﬀerent from those according to French weights. And if we do not aggregate
then there is no headline social inclusion target to match the others listed at
the start of this section.
3.2 An ambitious but realistic target?
The setting of an EU target for social inclusion is, in my view, essential to
ensure that this dimension of Europe receives proper weight in the EU2020
Agenda. What however is the appropriate level of ambition? The Commis-
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Figure 7: Relation between announced target and realised perfor-
mance
sion has considered a target of a reduction of a quarter, but why a quarter,
rather than a third or a ﬁfth? What is the “optimal tautness” of the pro-
gramme? This is the phrase used many years ago in the development plan-
ning literature. It is contained, for example, in the title of Holland (1961),
who made a case study of Soviet planning. (It is little remarked, but there
are parallels between the targeting and monitoring proposed in diﬀerent do-
mains of EU policy and earlier - now often derided - attempts at economic
planning.) Holland argued that the achieved performance was a non-linear
function of the target, ﬁrst increasing but reaching a maximum and then
declining as further increases in the target were felt to be unrealistic - see
Figure 7.
If by “realistic” is meant a target that can be expected to be achieved, then
the choice has to be at the intersection with the 45 degree line. With the solid
curve, this means that the actual performance is less than could be achieved
if the target set were more ambitious but unrealistic. As Holland notes, there
is a major diﬀerence between the solid curve and the dashed curve. In the
latter case, the “realistic” target is dominated by a less ambitious one that
will be over-achieved.
What is indeed a realistic target for EU2020? Let us take the at-risk-of-
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poverty indicator. One way of attaching a quantitative value is to be found
in the cost of eliminating the risk of poverty.3 In quantitative terms, the size
of the total poverty gap for the EU as a whole is the headcount (17 per cent)
times the mean gap. Suppose that the mean poverty gap is approximately
a quarter of the poverty threshold or 15 per cent of median income. If the
mean income is 8/7 times the median4 this means that the average size of the
“total poverty gap” per person in the overall population is 0.17*0.15*7/8 =
2.2 per cent of mean income. Elimination of poverty is however going to cost
considerably more than 2.2 per cent of total income since targeting is never
perfect (there are sizeable spill-overs from any transfer programme) and since
anti-poverty policies may lead to behavioural responses that increase the cost.
If every Ä1 reduction in the total poverty gap costs say Ä3, then eliminating
poverty (17 per cent) would cost 6.6 per cent of GDP. Put diﬀerently, 1
per cent of GDP “buys” a 2.5 percentage point reduction in the poverty
rate. Or, a 2.5 percentage point diﬀerence in the poverty rate “saves” a
country 1 per cent of GDP. Seen in terms of deﬁcit reduction targets, this
is a material diﬀerence. The above calculation depends of course on an
arbitrary assumption about the cost (the factor of 3) and it is only intended
to be illustrative of the kind of more elaborate exercise that is necessary.
A second approach is to consider the best-performing Member States,
where again I consider the at-risk-of-poverty indicator. It does not seem
realistic, given the diversity of EU27, to suppose that countries could emulate
the very best-performing. Rather it seems better to compare countries that
share certain identiﬁable common features: for example, Belgium might hope
to emulate the lower poverty rate of the Netherlands. In Figure 8 are plotted
the values for diﬀerent Member States for income year 2006 grouped in this
way (the labels in some cases stretch the imagination or geography). It may
be realistic to suppose that countries could reduce their at-risk-of-poverty
rates to the lowest achieved in their group, so that France and Germany
would reduce their rate to that in Austria. If this were achieved, then the
overall EU27 rate would fall by 3.2 percentage points and the total by some
16 million. The main contributors to this fall (more than a million in each
3I am drawing here on Atkinson, Marlier and Reinstadler (2010).
4Calculations based on the 2007 EU-SILC data (2006 income reference year) show that
the ratios of national mean income to national median income vary from 1.04 in Sweden
to 1.28 in Portugal. The simple (unweighted) average of the ratios calculated for the 24
available EU countries is 1.14 that is 8/7.
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Figure 8: Percentage of people living in households at-risk-of-
poverty (income year 2006) by regional groupings
case) would be Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania and the UK.
Both of these considerations – cost of poverty elimination and peer com-
parison - suggest that a target of a reduction of a quarter may indeed be
both “ambitious and realistic”, but the main purpose has been to raise the
question.
3.3 The need for an agreed monitoring procedure
Alongside the introduction of a social inclusion target there has to be an
agreed procedure for monitoring progress. This procedure needs to be set in
place at the outset, and it therefore seems helpful to set out some of the likely
considerations (I am again drawing on Atkinson, Marlier and Reinstadler,
2010). To make this concrete, I will suppose that the headline target is
that of reducing the at-risk-of-poverty rate by a quarter, with agreed targets
(reduction of 10 Xi percentage points for country i over the decade) for each
Member State that are consistent with the overall objective. In terms of
levels, this involves an agreement on the base year ﬁgure. If the target is
agreed in June 2010, then the base year could be the 2009 EU-SILC survey,
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with income reference year 2008 (except for Ireland and the UK). The target
path for Member State i would then be the 2008 value less Xi for each year
since 2008. (On the other hand, there may be a case for taking a base ﬁgure
averaged over 2 or 3 years.)
Following the Open Method of Co-ordination, the Social Protection Com-
mittee may be charged with responsibility for the monitoring process, based
on peer review.5 It is assumed that, as data become available to the Com-
mission from the reference source (EU-SILC), the Committee would consider
the outcome country by country, in relation to the agreed country-target.
However, there are several problems. The ﬁrst, immediate, one is that the
ﬁrst outcome year would relate to incomes in 2009, which are likely to be
heavily inﬂuenced by the economic crisis. For material deprivation, the im-
pact can be expected to be negative. For the at-risk-of-poverty indicator, the
median income is also negatively aﬀected and the poverty rate may move in
either direction.
The second, more fundamental problem concerns the criteria for moni-
toring changes over time. If a Member State deviates from the target path,
how large does an upward deviation have to be in order for this to be policy-
relevant? Answers to such a question tend to be given in statistical terms,
referring to the sampling error. Conﬁdence intervals can be calculated for
the estimated percentages (see, for example Ward et al, 2009, Figure 1.6).
The sampling errors reported for the 2005 EU-SILC for the proportion at-
risk-of-poverty imply a one-sided 95 per cent conﬁdence interval of less than
1 percentage point for 11 of the 23 countries and in all cases it is less than 2
percentage points (Eurostat, 2008). However, account has also to be taken
of non-sampling error. This may arise from incomplete population coverage
(e.g. omission of non-household population), from shortcomings in ques-
tion design (e.g. omission of income components, such as home-produced
goods), from diﬀerential non-response (e.g. lower response by high income
households), and from recording or processing mistakes. These are hard to
quantify but could be at least as important in quantitative terms.
These considerations refer to the “supply side”: the accuracy of the esti-
mates supplied by EU-SILC (or other sources). It is indeed a pre-requisite
5The SPC consists of oﬃcials from mainly Employment and Social Aﬀairs Ministries
in each Member State as well as representatives of the European Commission; it reports
to the EU “Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Aﬀairs” (EPSCO) Council
of Ministers.
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that the observed departures from the target path are statistically signiﬁ-
cant. But we have also to ask about the “demand” side. What diﬀerences
are of relevant for policy monitoring? Here it may be helpful to go back
to the discussion of the cost of poverty elimination. Earlier in this section,
I concluded that a diﬀerence of 2.5 percentage points would be a material
one from a policy perspective. It may therefore be reasonable to say that
Cases of policy concern should be identiﬁed by an upward departure from
the target path of 2 or more percentage points in the at-risk-of-poverty rate
when comparing the most recent year with the target path.
The statistical reporting is an important part of the monitoring process,
and it is essential that adequate resources be made available to allow the
reference source (EU-SILC) to be developed and improved (especially to
ensure coherence with national data sources). It is not however suﬃcient on
its own. When, in Atkinson (1996), I proposed a poverty target for the UK, I
drew a parallel with inﬂation targeting, where the Bank of England not only
follows a target but also publishes a regular Inﬂation Report, in which it
provides an economic analysis of the underlying inﬂation trends. I therefore
proposed that the setting of a UK poverty target should be accompanied
by a Poverty Report. Equally, in the EU context, the simple publication of
statistics would not suﬃce, and Member States should be expected to provide
accompanying analyses of the underlying trends.
3.4 An EU minimum income for children
I turn ﬁnally to the substantive reduction of poverty in Europe. Individual
Member States have made major progress, but performance across the EU
has been uneven. In my judgment, a signiﬁcant advance in reducing poverty
EU-wide requires concerted action. Under subsidiarity, such actions would be
implemented by Member States but the EU as a whole can set the guidelines
for the actions. The concrete proposal made here is that the EU begin
with a Basic Income for Children. Each Member State would be required
to guarantee unconditionally to every child a basic income, deﬁned as a
percentage of the Member State median equivalised income (and possibly age-
related). The implications of such a proposal have been modelled by Levy,
Lietz and Sutherland (2007) using the EU tax beneﬁt model, EUROMOD.
They show that a Child Basic Income set at 25% of national median income
would halve child poverty in all EU15 Member States except Italy and the
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UK. Implementation would be left to Member States, who could employ
diﬀerent instruments. The minimum could be provided via child beneﬁt,
via tax allowances, via tax credits, via beneﬁts in kind, or via employer-
mandated beneﬁts. The only restriction is that the set of instruments selected
must be capable of reaching the entire population. In view of the problem
of incomplete take-up, this requirement in my view rules out use of income-
tested schemes that rely on families claiming.
The ﬁrst reason for proposing an EU basic income for children is concern
about child poverty. One of the features of successive National Action Plans
(NAPs/inclusion) and EU Joint Reports on Social Inclusion is the increasing
attention paid to the issue of poverty among families with children. When
the ﬁrst NAPs/inclusion were drawn up in 2001, only a few Member States
highlighted the issue of children living in households at risk of poverty. The
United Kingdom at that time stood out for having adopted in 1999 a high-
proﬁle commitment to eradicating child poverty in 20 years and halving it
in 10 years. But there was increasing recognition of the problem in other
Member States in the next few years. The problem was extensively discussed
in the inﬂuential report of the Social Protection Committee (2008) on Child
Poverty and Well-Being in the EU (and see Frazer and Marlier, 2007).
A second reason for proposing an EU basic income for children is that
it would contribute positively to other EU headline objectives. The risks of
poverty and social exclusion among children are important in their own right,
but they also have implications for the future. As noted by the Conseil de
l’Emploi, des Revenus et de la Cohésion sociale (CERC) in their June 2004
Report, poverty aﬀects not only children’s well-being at the moment when
resources are insuﬃcient, but also the capacity of children to develop, to
build the required capabilities, including knowledge capital, cultural capital,
social capital, health capital. It would be a social investment, contributing
to the education and employment objectives.
4 Conclusions
 The EU agenda for the next decade must be drawn up taking account of
the successes and limitations of the Lisbon Agenda, notably the failure
to achieve a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social
exclusion;
 Social and economic policy have to be designed together, in such a way
23A.B. Atkinson / WP n.24 DiSSE, University of Macerata
that their actions are complementary rather than in conﬂict; the EU
2020 Agenda has to be seen as a whole, with Member States subscribing
to all elements;
 Progress in reducing poverty requires concerted action by the EU, ac-
tion which is consistent with subsidiarity but which goes beyond the
measures taken in the past decade;
 The setting of concrete poverty target(s) is much to be welcomed, but
the design of these targets needs careful consideration;
 Targets need to be ambitious but realistic; I have suggested two ap-
proaches to implementation: cost of poverty elimination and peer com-
parison;
 Whatever targets are agreed, there needs also to be an agreed procedure
for monitoring performance in relation to these targets;
 The central aim is to make substantive progress in reducing poverty; I
have made one concrete policy proposal to that end: the introduction
of an EU basic income for children;
 An EU basic income for children could contribute positively to other
headline targets, notably education and employment;
 Social science research (both recent and vintage) has aided the develop-
ment of underlying concepts and to the analysis of the causes of poverty;
 Investment in statistical instruments has been essential to the EU policy-
making progress, and this investment needs to be maintained.
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